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Abstract
Sponsored Search Auctions (SSAs) arguably represent the problem at the intersection of computer science
and economics with the deepest applications in real life. Within the realm of SSAs, the study of the effects
that showing one ad has on the other ads, a.k.a. externalities in economics, is of utmost importance and has
so far attracted the attention of much research. However, even the basic question of modeling the problem has
so far escaped a definitive answer. The popular cascade model is arguably too idealized to really describe the
phenomenon yet it allows a good comprehension of the problem. Other models, instead, describe the setting more
adequately but are too complex to permit a satisfactory theoretical analysis. In this work, we attempt to get the
best of both approaches: firstly, we define a number of general mathematical formulations for the problem in the
attempt to have a rich description of externalities in SSAs and, secondly, prove a host of results drawing a nearly
complete picture about the computational complexity of the problem. We complement these approximability
results with some considerations about mechanism design in our context.
1 Introduction
The computation of solutions maximizing the social welfare, i.e., maximizing the total “happiness” of the ad-
vertisers, in sponsored search auctions (SSAs) strongly depends on how such happiness is defined. Clearly, the
more clicks their ads receive, the more content advertisers are. A naive measure to forecast clicks, named click
through rate (CTR), would only consider the quality of the ad itself (“better” ads receive more clicks). However,
one cannot overlook the importance of externalities in this context: specifically, slot-dependent externalities (i.e.,
ads positioned higher in the list have a higher chance to get a click) and ad-dependent externalities (e.g., the ad of
a strong competitor – e.g., BMW – shown in the first slot can only decrease the number of clicks that the ad – e.g.,
of Mercedes – in the second slot gets). Much research focused on modeling externalities in SSAs and providing
algorithms for the resulting optimization problem.
On one hand of the scale, there is the simple, yet neat, cascade model [9, 1]. In the cascade model, users
are assumed to scan the ads sequentially from top to bottom and the probability with which a user clicks on the
ad ai shown in slot sm is the product of the intrinsic quality qi of the ad, the relevance λm of slot sm (slot-
dependant externality) and of all the ads allocated to slots s1 through sm−1. A host of results is proved in this
model as the input parameters vary (e.g., λm ∈ {0, 1} rather than λm ∈ [0, 1]). In its more general version,
the optimization problem of social welfare maximization is conjectured to be NP-hard, shown to be in APX (i.e.,
a 1/4-approximation algorithm is given) and shown to admit a QPTAS (a quasi-polynomial time approximation
scheme) [9]. In addition to its unknown computational complexity, the cascade model has two main limitations to
be considered a satisfactory model of externalities in SSAs. First, it assumes that users have unlimited “memory”
and that, consequently, an ad in slot s1 exerts externalities to an ad many slots below. This is experimentally
disproved in [7] wherein it is observed how the distance between ads is important. Second, it assumes that the
externality of an ad is the same no matter what ad is exerted on. Nevertheless, while BMW can have a strong
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FNEaa(c) FNEaa(K) FNEsa(c)nr r nr r
LB APX-hard
APX-complete poly-APX-complete APX-complete P ⋆
UB log(N)2min{N,K}
⋆
SP log(N)2min{N,K}
⋆
1/2 1/K 1/2 1 ⋆
Table 1: Summary of our results: LB (UB, resp.) stands for lower (upper, resp.) bound on the approximation
of the problem; the row SP, instead, contains the approximation guarantees we obtain with truthful mechanisms.
Results marked by ‘⋆’ require c = O(1). APX-completeness of a subclass of FNEaa(c)-nr is also given. (See the
model for details on the notation.)
externality on Mercedes since both makers attract the high end of market, the externality on makers in a different
price bracket, e.g., KIA, is arguably much less strong.
On the other hand of the scale, we can find models that try to address these limitations. In [6] Fotakis et
al. propose a model whereby users have limited memory, i.e., externalities occur only within a window of c
consecutive slots, and consider the possibility that externalities boost CTRs (positive externalities) as well as
reduce CTRs (negative externalities). In particular, the externalities of an ad apply to ads displayed c slots below
(forward externalities) and ads displayed c slots above (backward externalities). Moreover, in order to model the
fact that externalities might have ad-dependent effect, they introduce the concept of contextual graph, whereby
vertices represent ads and edge weights represent the externality between the endpoints. Their model turned out
to be too rich to allow tight and significant algorithmic results (their main complexity results apply to the arguably
less interesting case of forward positive externalities).
1.1 Our contribution
The present work can be placed in the middle of this imaginary spectrum of models for externalities in SSAs. Our
main aim is to enrich the literature by means of more general ways to model slot- and ad-dependent externalities,
while giving a (nearly) complete picture of the computational complexity of the problem. We do not attempt to
explicitly model the user’s behavior but bridge the aforementioned models in order to overcome the respective
weaknesses. In detail, we enrich the naive model of SSAs by adding the concepts of window and contextual
externalities, while keeping ad- and slot-dependent externalities factorized as in the cascade model. We also
complement much of the known literature by studying a model wherein the externalities coming from ads and
slots cannot be expressed as a product. Our study gives rise to a number of novel and rich models for which we can
provide (often tight) approximability results (see Table 1 for an overview).1 Since the case of selfish advertisers is
of particular relevance in this context, we also initiate the study of mechanism design for the optimization problems
introduced and consider the incentive-compatibility of our algorithms, i.e., whether they can be augmented with
payment functions so to work also with selfish advertisers.
For the version in which slot- and ad-dependant externalities cannot be factorized and externalities occur in a
window of size c, we prove that the optimization problem is in P , if c is a constant. We consider the LP relaxation
of the ILP describing the problem and prove that the integrality gap is 1.
For the variant of the problem with factorized externalities, contextual ad-dependent externalities and window
of c slots, a distinction on the effects that empty slots have on users’ behavior is useful. In a sort of whole page
optimization fashion [10], we think of those slots as occupied by a special (fictitious) ad used to refresh (e.g., by
means of pictures) the user’s attention.
If the special ad cannot be used (or, equivalently, the user’s attention cannot be reset) we prove that the
allocation problem is poly-APX-complete whenever users have a “large” memory (i.e., the window equals the
number of slots K). Specifically, we give an approximation preserving reduction from the Longest Path problem
and design an approximation algorithm using several different ideas and sources of approximation; interestingly,
its approximation guarantee matches the best known approximation guarantee for Longest Path. However, we
prove that this algorithm cannot be used in any truthful mechanism and note that a simple single-item second
price auction gives a weaker, yet close, truthful approximation. We complement the results for this model with the
identification of tractable instances for which we provide an exact polynomial-time algorithm. For c < K instead,
1It is important to notice that, as common in the literature on SSAs, the number of slots is a parameter of the problem (rather than fixed)
for otherwise the computational problem becomes easy (by, e.g., running the color coding algorithm).
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we are unable to determine the exact hardness of approximating the problem in general. To the APX-hardness
proof, we pair a number of approximation algorithms that assume constant c. The first, based on color coding
[2], returns a non-constant approximation on any instance of SSA. The second assumes that the contextual graph
is complete and returns a solution which (roughly) guarantees a γcmin fraction of the optimum social welfare,
γmin being the minimum edge weight in the graph. Interestingly, this algorithm shows the APX-completeness
of the subclass of instances having constant γmin (we indeed further provide a hardness result for instances with
complete contextual graphs). We believe the tight result for this subclass of instances to be quite relevant. In fact,
complete contextual graphs are quite likely to happen in real-life: the results returned by a keyword search are
highly related to one another, and, as such, each pair of ads has a non-null externality, however small.
If the special ad can be used, the problem becomes easier and turns out to be APX-complete, for any c. We
first prove the problem with c = K to be APX-hard, via a reduction from (a subclass of) ATSP (i.e., asymmetric
version of TSP) and then surprisingly connect instances with c < K to instances with c = K by reducing the case
with c = 1 to the case with c = K and binary externalities (intuitively, the weights of the edges of the contextual
graph can be either 0 or 1). We finally observe how a simple greedy algorithm cleverly uses the special ad to return
1/2-approximate solutions and leads to a truthful mechanism.
2 Model
In a SSA we have N ads and K slots. We assume that each ad corresponds to an advertiser; this is w.l.o.g. from
the optimization point of view. We denote each ad by ai with i ∈ N , where N = {1, . . . , N} is the set of indices
of the ads. We introduce a fictitious ad, denoted by a⊥, s.t., when allocated, the slot is left empty. The K slots are
denoted by sm with m ∈ K, K = {1, . . . ,K} being the set of slot indices s.t. s1 is the slot at the top of the page
and sK is at the bottom. We also have a fictitious slot, denoted by s⊥ s.t. an ad allocated to s⊥ is not displayed in
the webpage. Each ad ai is characterized by: (i) the quality qi ∈ [0, 1], i.e., the probability a user clicks on ad ai
when he observes it, irrespectively of other externalities; (ii) the valuation vi ∈ R+ advertiser i associates to his
ad being clicked by a user. The fictitious ad a⊥ has q⊥ = v⊥ = 0.
A feasible allocation of ads to slots, denoted as θ, consists of an ordered sequence of ads θ = 〈a1, . . . , aK〉 s.t.
the ads are ordered by increasing slot number, i.e., a1 is allocated to the top slot, aK to the bottom one. Every ad
ai can be allocated to at most one slot, whereas a⊥ can be allocated to more than one slot. The set of all possible
feasible allocations is denoted as Θ. With a slight abuse of notation, we let (i) θ(ai) denote the index of the slot ad
ai is allocated to, and (ii) θ(sm) denote the index of the ad allocated to sm. Given θ ∈ Θ, the click through rate of
ad ai, denoted as CTRi(θ), is the probability ad ai is clicked by the user taking externalities into consideration.
The optimal allocation θ∗ is the one maximizing the social welfare, namely: θ∗ ∈ argmaxθ∈Θ SW (θ), where
SW (θ) =
∑
i∈N
CTRi(θ)vi.
A 1/α-approximate solution θ satisfies SW (θ) ≥ SW (θ∗)/α.
Typically, CTRi(θ) defines how the quality qi of ad ai is “perturbed” by the externalities in terms of click
probability. Accordingly, in general CTRi(θ) = qiΓi(θ), Γi(θ) being a function encoding the effect of externali-
ties. E.g., in the cascade model,
Γi(θ) = Λθ(ai)
θ(ai)−1∏
l=1
γθ(sl),
where Λθ(ai) =
∏θ(ai)
l=1 λl, λm ∈ [0, 1], called the factorized prominence of sm, denotes the slot-dependant
externality and γi ∀i ∈ N , called continuation probability, denotes the ad-dependent externality. (W.l.o.g., we
assume Λ1 = λ1 = 1.) Our conceptual contribution rests upon novel and richer ways to define Γi(θ), along three
main dimensions.
The first dimension concerns the user memory, a.k.a. window. We let c be the number of ads displayed
above ai in θ, from sθ(ai)−1 to sθ(ai)−c, that affect Γi(θ). The second dimension concerns a generalization of
the externalities. Here we propose two alternative families of externalities, called sa (for slot-ad) and aa (for
ad-ad). The sa-externalities remove the factorization in slot- and ad–dependent externalities: i.e., λm and γi are
substituted by parameters γm,j ∈ [0, 1], m ∈ K and j ∈ N . When the window is c, the CTR is defined as
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CTRi(θ) = qiΓi(θ), where
Γi(θ) =
θ(ai)−1∏
m=max{1,θ(ai)−c}
γm,θ(sm).
This definition captures the situation in which an ad can affect the ads displayed below it in a different way
according to the position in which it is displayed. For the aa-externalities, on the other hand, we preserve the
factorization in λm and γi, but redefine these latter parameters as γi,j ∈ [0, 1] where aj is the ad that is displayed
in the slot just below θ(ai). It is convenient to see the γi,j’s as the weights of the contextual graph G = (N , E)
where the direct edges (i, j) weigh γi,j > 0 and represent the way ad ai influences aj . Note that non-edges of G
correspond to the pairs of ads ai, aj s.t. γi,j = 0. Here, with window c,
Γi(θ) = Λθ(ai)
θ(ai)−1∏
l=max{1,θ(ai)−c}
γθ(sl),θ(sl+1)
where Λm is defined as above. This definition captures the situation in which each ad can affect each other ad in
a different way.
The third dimension concerns the definition of γm,⊥ for the sa-externalities and γi,⊥ and γ⊥,i for the aa-
externalities. In the model with reset we have γm,⊥ = 1 for sa and γi,⊥ = γ⊥,i = 1 ∀i ∈ N ∪ {⊥} for aa. This
variant captures the situation in which slots can be distributed in the page in different positions (a.k.a., slates) and,
in order to raise the user’s attention, we can allocate a content, e.g. pictures, that nullifies the externality between
the ad allocated before and after the content. In the model without reset, γm,⊥ = 0 for sa and γi,⊥ = γ⊥,i = 0
∀i ∈ N ∪ {⊥} for aa, thus capturing the situation in which leaving a slot empty between two allocated slots does
not provide any advantage.
We let FNEx(c)-y be the problem of optimizing the social welfare in our model with Forward Negative
Externalities with window c, x ∈ {sa, aa}-externalities and y ∈ {r, nr} reset (r stands for reset; nr for no re-
set). When the value of y is not relevant for our results, we talk about FNEx(c). We are interested in two particular
subclasses of FNEaa(c), namely: (i) subclass FNE+aa(c)-y, defined upon a complete contextual graph and such
that 0 < γmin = mini,j∈N ,i6=j γi,j and (ii) subclass B–FNEaa(c)-y, where γi,j can take values in {0, 1}.
2.1 Mechanism design
We use the theory of mechanism design to study the incentive-compatibility of our algorithms [12]. A mechanism
M is a pair (A,P ), where A : (R+)N → Θ is an algorithm that associates to any vector v = (v1, . . . , vN ) of
valuations a feasible outcome in Θ (only valuations are private knowledge). The payment function Pi : (R+)N →
R
+ maps valuation vectors to monetary charges for advertiser i. The aim of each advertiser is to maximize his
own utility ui(v, vi) = CTRi(A(v))vi − Pi(v). An advertiser could misreport his true valuation and declare
vˆi 6= vi when ui((vˆi,v−i), vi) > ui(v, vi), v−i being the vector of the valuations of all the agents but i. We are
then interested in truthful mechanisms. A mechanism is truthful if for any i ∈ N , v−i ∈ (R+)N−1, vi, vˆi ∈ R+,
ui((vˆi,v−i), vi) ≤ ui(v, vi).
In this setting, a monotone algorithm must be used in truthful mechanisms [3]. Algorithm A is monotone if
for any i ∈ N , v−i ∈ (R+)N−1, CTRi(A(vˆi,v−i)) is non-decreasing in vˆi. Important for our work is also the
family of VCG-like mechanisms, a.k.a., Maximal In Range (MIR) mechanisms. An algorithm A is MIR if there
exists Θ′ ⊆ Θ s.t. A(v) ∈ arg maxθ∈Θ′ SW (θ) ∀v ∈ RN [11]. These algorithms can be augmented with a
VCG-like payment so to obtain truthful mechanisms. (VCGs are MIR mechanisms wherein Θ′ = Θ.) We are
interested in mechanisms for which both A and P are computable in polynomial time. MIR mechanisms run in
polynomial-time if the MIR algorithm does. As usual in the context of SSA, we adopt a pay-per-click payment
scheme, i.e., we charge Pi(v)/CTRi(A(v)) when a user clicks on ai.
3 FNEsa(c) is in P for constant c
Our presentation focuses on FNEsa(1)-nr to simplify the notation. The more general cases when c > 1 and the
reset model is considered are easily obtainable by generalization from FNEsa(1), but require a more cumbersome
notation without significant new ideas (see discussion at the end of this section). We first give the ILP formulation
of FNEsa(1)-nr and prove that if there is an optimal fractional solution, then there are at least two feasible integral
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solutions with the same value of social welfare. Since it is well known, by LP theory, that the ellipsoid algorithm
can be forced (in polynomial-time) to output an integral optimal solution, we are able to prove the following:
Theorem 1. For c = O(1), there is a polynomial-time optimal algorithm for FNEsa(c).
FNEsa(1)-nr can be formulated as following ILP:
max
K∑
m=2
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
γm−1,jqivixj,m,i +
∑
i∈N
x1,iqivi
subject to:
K∑
m=2
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
xj,m,i + x1,i ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N
x1,i =
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
xi,2,j ∀i ∈ N∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
xj,m,i =
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
xi,m+1,j ∀i ∈ N ,
2 ≤ m < K∑
i∈N
x1,i = 1 (1)∑
j∈N
∑
i∈N ,i6=j
xj,m,i = 1 ∀m ∈ K \ {1}
x1,i ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N
xj,m,i ∈ {0, 1} ∀2 ≤ m ≤ K,
i, j ∈ N , i 6= j
where xj,m,i = 1 iff ai is allocated to slot sm, m > 1, and aj is allocated to slot sm−1; x1,i = 1 iff ai is allocated
to s1. The objective function and the constraints are rather straightforward and, hence, their description is omitted
here.
The next proposition proves Theorem 1 since it shows that we can solve the above ILP in polynomial-time,
despite its similarities with the 3D-assignment, a well-known NP -hard problem.
Proposition 1. The continuous relaxation of the above ILP always admits integral optimal solutions.
Proof. We show that, if there is an optimal fractional solution x, then there are at least two feasible integral solu-
tions with the same value of social welfare. Specifically, we prove that x is equivalent to a probability distribution
over integral allocations θ = 〈a1, . . . , aK〉. The probability P(θ) given to θ is:
P(θ) =
K∏
i=1
P
θ(ai) = si∣∣∣ ∧
j<i
θ(aj) = sj

= x1,1
K∏
l=2
xl−1,l,l∑
m≥l
xl−1,l,m
.
In order to show that P(θ) is actually a probability distribution over allocations, we show that
∑
θ∈Θ P(θ) = 1.
The proof is recursive. Let Θ′ be the set of allocations θ with the same first K − 1 ads. The allocations in Θ′
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differ only for the ad allocated to sK . To fix the notation, for θ ∈ Θ′ let θ(sl) = al, for l < K . We have:
∑
θ∈Θ′
P(θ) = x1,1
K−1∏
l=2
(
xl−1,l,l∑
m≥l xl−1,l,m
) ∑
h≥K
xK−1,K,h∑
m≥K
xK−1,K,m
= x1,1
K−1∏
l=2
(
xl−1,l,l∑
m≥l xl−1,l,m
) ∑
h≥K xK−1,K,h∑
m≥K xK−1,K,m
= x1,1
K−1∏
l=2
(
xl−1,l,l∑
m≥l xl−1,l,m
)
.
By applying recursively the same argument above from Θ′′ ⊃ Θ′, the set of all allocations θ satisfying θ(sl) = al,
for l ≤ K − 2, down to the set of allocations having only the same first ad, we have
∑
θ:θ(s1)=a1
P(θ) = x1,1.
Since (1) forces∑i∈N x1,i = 1, we have∑θ∈Θ P(θ) = ∑i∈N x1,i = 1. This shows that P(θ) is a well defined
probability distribution. The proof concludes by observing that all integral solutions are indeed feasible.
To solve the problem when c > 1, we just need to modify the ILP and allow each variable x to depend on c + 2
indices to take into account the (at most) c indices of all the ads that precede the ad of interest. The reset model
for c = 1 instead requires the introduction of K additional variables for a⊥ to be visualized in each slot (together
with some constraints to fix each variable for a⊥ to a slot).
Theorem 1 implies that mechanism design becomes an easy problem for FNEsa(c) and c = O(1), since the
optimal algorithm can be used to obtain a truthful VCG mechanism.
4 FNEaa(K)-nr is Poly–APX–Complete
4.1 Easy Instances
As a warm-up, we identify a significant class of instances of FNEaa(K)-nr for which we can design a polynomial-
time optimal algorithm. These instances are characterized by the fact that the underlying contextual graph is a
DAG, thus modeling nearly oligopolistic markets in which the ads can be organized hierarchically. The idea of
Algorithm 1 is that since DAGs can be sorted topologically in polynomial time then we can rename the ads as
a1, . . . , aN so to guarantee that for any pair of ads ai, aj , if i < j then (aj , ai) /∈ E . We can then prove that we
can focus w.l.o.g. on ordered allocations θ, i.e., for any pair of allocated ads ai, aj , with i < j, θ(ai) ≤ θ(aj).
Consider an unordered θ and let ai be the first ad (from the top) for which there exists aj , i < j, such that
θ(ai) > θ(aj). Since γj,i = 0 then all the ads ak s.t. θ(ak) ≥ θ(ai) have CTRk(θ) = 0 and, therefore, we
can prune θ of (i.e., substitute with a⊥) ai and all the subsequent ads without any loss in the social welfare.
But then in the class of ordered allocations, the optimum has an optimal substructure and we can use dynamic
programming. Let D[i,m] be the value of the optimal ordered allocation that uses only slots sm, . . . , sK and
allocates ad ai in sm. It is not hard to see that D[i,m] = Λmqivi +maxj>i γi,jD[j,m+1] and that the optimum
is maxi∈[N ]D[i, 1]. In the pseudo-code of the algorithm, we simply construct the table D after the topological
sort of the contextual graph (with renaming of the ads) is done. The algorithm runs in time O(KN2).
Algorithm 1
1: TOPOLOGICALSORT(G)
2: for all m ≤ K do
3: D[N,m] = ΛmqNvN
4: for all i ≤ N do
5: D[i,K] = ΛKqivi
6: for i = N − 1 to 1 do
7: for m = K − 1 to 1 do
8: D[i,m] = Λmqivi +maxj>i γi,jD[j,m+ 1]
9: return (maxi∈[N ]D[i, 1])
Since social welfare maximization is a utilitarian problem, and given that the algorithm above is optimal we can
use the VCG mechanism to obtain a polynomial-time optimal truthful mechanism.
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4.2 Hardness
We now prove the hardness of approximating FNEaa(K)-nr.
Theorem 2. FNEaa(K)-nr is poly–APX–hard.
Proof. We reduce from the Longest Path problem. An instance of the Longest Path problem consists of a direct
graph G′ = (T,A) where T is the set of vertices of the graph and A 6= ∅ is the set of unweighted edges. The
problem demands to compute a longest simple path, i.e., a maximum length path that visits each vertex of the
graph at most once. This problem is poly–APX–complete [5] and the best known asymptotic approximation is
log |T |/|T |. From an instance G′ = (T,A) of Longest Path we obtain an instance of FNEaa(K)-nr as follows.
For each vertex ti ∈ T we add an ad ai, with qi = vi = 1 and for each directed arc (ti, tj) ∈ A we add an arc
(i, j) in E . Furthermore, we set γi,j = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E and γi,j = 0 otherwise. Finally, we set N = K = |T | and
Λm = 1, ∀m ∈ [K].
Given an ordered sequence of vertices ρ = (t1, t2, . . . , tN ), we denote as len(ρ) the length of the path that
starts in t1 and visits the nodes in ρ till the first node tj s.t. (tj , tj+1) 6∈ A is reached. Let us denote as ρ∗
the sequence that describes the longest path in G′ and as θ∗ the allocation that maximizes the social welfare
in the instance of FNEaa(K)-nr defined upon G′. It is easy to check that len(ρ∗) = SW (θ∗) − 1. Indeed,
θ∗ allocates sequentially from the first slot the ads that correspond to the vertices composing the longest path.
Conversely, we can transform an allocation θ into a sequence of vertices ρ just by substituting the ads with their
corresponding vertices until the first a⊥ in θ is found. Thus, we have that for θ and the corresponding ρ it holds
len(ρ) = SW (θ)− 1.
Consider a generic α-approximate allocation θα for FNEaa(K)-nr: SW (θα) ≥ αSW (θ∗). Since A is non-
empty, there is a solution θ2 to FNEaa(K)-nr of social welfare at least 2. Let θβ denote the solution in {θα, θ2}
with maximum social welfare. As θα is an α-approximate solution so is θβ . By letting ρβ denote the path
constructed from θβ as described above, we prove that the reduction preserves the approximation (up to a constant
factor): len(ρβ) = SW (θβ)− 1 ≥ 12SW (θβ) ≥ α2 SW (θ∗) = α2 (len (ρ∗) + 1) ≥ α2 len(ρ∗).
4.3 Approximation algorithm
We show that the problem is in poly–APX, with an approximation ratio that is asymptotically the same as the best
guarantee known for Longest Path. Our algorithm combines the Color Coding (CC) algorithm [2] together with
three approximation steps.
Let C be a set containing K different colors. CC is a random algorithm, randomly assigning colors from C
to the ads, and then finding the best colorful (i.e., no pair of ads has the same color) allocation. To find the best
colorful allocation, given a random coloring we do the following. For S ⊆ C, we define (S, ai) as the set of partial
allocations with the properties of having the same number |S| of allocated ads (each colored with a different color
of S) in the first |S| slots and having ad ai in slot s|S|. We start from S = ∅ where no ad is allocated. Then,
allocating one of the ads in the first position, we add one color to S until S = C. Iteratively, the algorithm extends
the allocations in (S, ai) appending a new ad, say aj , with a color not in S in slot s|S|+1 obtaining (S ∪ {oj}, aj)
where oj is the color of aj . Each partial allocation in (S, ai) is characterized by the values of SW and Γi. We can
safely discard all the Pareto dominated partial allocations: given two allocations θ1 and θ2 in (S, ai), we say that
θ2 is Pareto dominated by θ1 iff SW (θ1) ≥ SW (θ2) and Γi(θ1) ≥ Γi(θ2). However, there is no guarantee that
the number of allocations in (S, ai) is polynomially bounded and, in principle, all the generated O(NK) partial
allocations may be Pareto efficient. The complexity per coloring is O(2KNK+1K2). CC generates eK random
colorings, but it can be derandomized with a cost of log2(N) and a total complexityO((2e)KK2NK+1(logN)2).
To make the algorithm polynomial, we apply three approximation steps. Initially, we briefly sketch these three
approximations and, subsequently, we provide the details. Firstly, we run CC over a reduced number K ′ of slots
where K ′ = min(⌈log(N)⌉,K). Secondly, we discard all the allocations θ in which the probability to click on the
last allocated ad is smaller than a given δ ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, we discretize the γi,j ’s. We prove in the following that
the running time is indeed polynomial and the approximation ratio is (1 − δ)(1 − ǫ) log(N)2min{N,K} , ǫ controlling the
granularity of the γi,j discretization. All the three approximations are necessary in order to obtain a polynomial-
time algorithm. This algorithm is not monotone as we show below. However, a simple 1/K-approximate truthful
mechanism can be obtained, via a single-item second price auction. From here on, we provide the details of the
algorithms and we prove its approximation ratio.
underlineApproximation 1. We apply CC over a reduced number K ′ of slots, where K ′ = min(⌈log(N)⌉,K),
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implying the following approximation ratio.
Proposition 2. Given θ∗, the optimal allocation over K slots, and θ∗K′ , the optimal allocation over the first
K ′ ≤ min{N,K} slots, we have SW (θ∗K′) ≥ 12
K′
min{N,K}SW (θ
∗).
Proof. We partition K ′′ = min{N,K} slots in groups of K ′ consecutive slots. There could be remaining slots
that will constitute the last group with less then K ′ slots. The number of groups in which the K slots are divided
is NG = ⌈K
′′
K′
⌉. Let Gi = {(i − 1)K ′ + 1, . . . ,min(iK ′,K)}, for i ∈ [NG], be the i-th group of indices of K ′
slots.
We let SW (θ|Gi) =
∑
m∈Gi
ΛmΓθ(m)(θ)qθ(m)vθ(m), for any θ ∈ Θ. Since SW (θ∗) =
∑NG
i=1 SW (θ
∗|Gi),
there must exist a groupGi s.t. SW (θ∗|Gi) ≥ 1NGSW (θ
∗). Observing that ⌈K
′′
K′
⌉ ≤ K
′′
K′
+1 andK ′ ≤ K ′′ we get
SW (θ∗|Gi) ≥
K′
2K′′SW (θ
∗). The proof concludes by noting that, by optimality, SW (θ∗K′) ≥ SW (θ∗|Gi).
Approximation 2. In CC, we discard allocations θ in which Γi(θ) of the last allocated ad ai, i ∈ [N ], is less than a
given δ ∈ [0, 1], implying the following approximation ratio.
Proposition 3. Given θ∗K′ , the optimal allocation over K ′ slots, and θδK′ the optimal allocation among the alloca-
tions θ ∈ Θ where the last allocated ad ai, i ≤ N , satisfies Γi(θ) ≥ δ, we have SW
(
θδK′
)
≥ (1− δ)SW (θ∗K′).
Proof. Consider the allocation θ∗K′ and assume that the last ad satisfying Γi(θ∗K′) ≥ δ is the one in slot sl.
Recalling the notation SW (θ|S) for S ⊆ [K], provided in the proof of Proposition 2, by optimality of θ∗K′
we have SW (θ∗K′) ≥ 1Γθ∗
K′
(l+1)
SW (θ∗K′ |{l + 1, . . . ,K}). Indeed, on the r.h.s. we have a lower bound on
the social welfare that the ads allocated by θ∗K′ in slots sl+1, . . . , sK′ would have if shifted to the first slot.
If this were bigger than SW (θ∗K′) then θ∗K′ would not be optimal. But then since Γθ∗K′(l+1) < δ, we have
δSW (θ∗K′) ≥ SW (θ
∗
K′ |{l+ 1, . . . ,K}).
Finally we have that θδK′ , the allocation that removes from θ∗K′ the ads allocated from sl+1 to sK′ , has
SW (θδK′) = SW (θ
∗
K′)− SW (θ
∗
K′ |{l+ 1, . . . ,K}) ≥ SW (θ
∗
K′)− δSW (θ
∗
K′) = (1− δ)SW (θ
∗
K′).
Approximation 3. In CC, we use rounded values for γi,j . More precisely, we use ⌊ 1τ log
1
γi,j
⌋ in place of log 1
γi,j
,
where the normalization constant τ is defined below. The constraint due to Proposition 3 is now a capacity con-
straint of the form
∑
m∈[K]:m<l⌊
1
τ
log 1
γθ(m),θ(m+1)
⌋ ≤ ⌊ 1
τ
log 1
δ
⌋. Notice that, with rounded values, the capacity
can assume a finite number of values (i.e., ⌊ 1
τ
log 1
δ
⌋) and therefore we can now bound the number of allocations
to be stored in (S, ai). More precisely, for each value of capacity, we can discard all the allocations except one
maximizing the social welfare measured with rounded values. This step has the following consequences on the
approximation guarantee.
Proposition 4. Given θδK′ , defined as in Proposition 3, and θδǫK′ , the optimal allocation when the rounding proce-
dure is applied, we have that, choosing τ = 1
K′
log 11−ǫ , SW
(
θδǫK′
)
≥ (1− ǫ)SW
(
θδK′
)
.
Proof. Let ξxm,m+1 be a shorthand for log 1γθx
K′
(m),θx
K′
(m+1)
and x(i) be a shorthand for θxK′(ai), for x ∈ {δǫ, δ}.
By definition:
SW
(
θδǫK′
)
=
∑
i∈[N ]
Λδǫ(i)Γi
(
θδǫK′
)
qivi
=
∑
i∈[N ]
Λδǫ(i)
∏
m<δǫ(i)
2−ξ
δǫ
m,m+1qivi.
Since ξδǫm,m+1 ≤ τ(⌊ 1τ ξ
δǫ
m,m+1⌋+ 1), we then have
SW
(
θδǫK′
)
≥
∑
i∈[N ]
Λδǫ(i)
∏
m<δǫ(i)
2−τ(⌊
1
τ
ξδǫm,m+1⌋+1)qivi
≥
∑
i∈[N ]
Λδ(i)
∏
m<δ(i)
2−τ(⌊
1
τ
ξδm,m+1⌋+1)qivi,
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where the latter inequality follows from optimality of θδK′ . Given that ⌊y⌋ ≤ y we can conclude that SW
(
θδǫK′
)
is
bounded from below by:
∑
i∈[N ]
Λδ(i)
 ∏
m<δ(i)
2
log γ
θδ
K′
(m),θδ
K′
(m+1)
−τ
 qivi
≥ 2−K
′τ ·
∑
i
Λδ(i)Γi
(
θδK′
)
qivi
= (1− ǫ) ·
∑
i
Λδ(i)Γi
(
θδK′
)
qivi = (1− ǫ)SW
(
θδK′
)
.
This concludes the proof.
The approximation ratio of the algorithm is thus (1− δ)(1− ǫ) log(N)2min{N,K} , asymptotically the same as the best
known approximation ratio of the Longest Path once N = K . The complexity instead can be derived as follows.
The maximum number of allocations that can be stored in each (S, ai) is O(
log 1
δ
τ
) with τ = log
1
1−ǫ
K′
thanks to
dominations. Thus, given that log( 11−ǫ) → ǫ as ǫ→ 0, the number of elements is O(K
′ 1
ǫ
). Thus, the complexity
when K ′ = log(N) is O((2e)log(N) 1
ǫ
log(1
δ
)N2 log4(N)) = O( 1
ǫδ
N3 log4(N)).
Notice that all the three above approximations are necessary in order to obtain a polynomial–time algorithm.
Approximation 2 and Approximation 3 allow us to bound the number of the allocations stored per pair (S, ai) and
would lead, if applied without Approximation 1, to a complexity O((2e)KK2N2 log2(N) 1
ǫδ
). Notice also that,
without Approximation 2, the possible values for the capacity are not upper bounded. Approximation 1 allows us
to remove the exponential dependence on K and to obtain polynomial complexity.
Non–monotonicity of the approximation algorithm
In this section we prove that the algorithm is not monotone and therefore we cannot augment it with a payment
function to obtain a truthful mechanism.
Let us initially consider the case where Approximation 1 is not used, therefore all the K slots can be allocated.
We will discuss below how to extend the proof to the case where Approximation 1 is used.
Consider the following instance of FNEsa(K)-nr:
• K = 3 slots;
• N = 4 ads, where q1v1 = 22τ Λ2−Λ32
−6τ
Λ2−Λ3
+3, q2v2 = x, q3v3 = q4v4 = 1, where τ is the generic rounding
factor of Approximation 3;
• the contextual graph is s.t. γi,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ [N ] except: γ1,2 = 2(−4+φ)τ , γ1,3 = 2−τ , γ2,4 = 2−τ ,
γ3,2 = 2
−τ
. φ is a small number;
• the rounded capacity
⌊
log 1
γi,j
τ
⌋
= +∞∀i, j ∈ [N ] except:
⌊
log 1
γ1,2
τ
⌋
= 3,
⌊
log 1
γ1,3
τ
⌋
= 1,
⌊
log 1
γ2,4
τ
⌋
= 1,⌊
log 1
γ32
τ
⌋
= 1.
• the K colours are {o1, o2, o3}.
The product q1v1 has been chosen s.t., when x is in the neighbourhood of 22τ Λ2−Λ32
−4τ
Λ2−Λ3
, a1 is always allocated
in the first slot. Thus, we can focus only on the colouring that assigns colour o1 to a1, o2 to a2 and o3 to a3 and a4.
Indeed, with this colouring the two longest path of the contextual graph are colourful, i.e. the unique two colourful
allocations are θ1 = (a1, a3, a2) in the set ({o1, o2, o3}, a2) and θ2 = (a1, a2, a4) in the set ({o1, o2, o3}, a4).
Notice that, with this colouring, all the allocations where there is a pair of ads (ai, aj) with γi,j = 0 are
infeasible, not satisfying the capacity bound. We will now prove that the approximation algorithm is not monotone
with respect to a2.
Let us denote by S˜W the social welfare computed on the basis of the rounded values. It is easy to check that
the following hold: S˜W (θ1) = 22τ Λ2−Λ32
−6τ
Λ2−Λ3
+ 3 + Λ22
−4τx + Λ32
−6τ and S˜W (θ2) = 22τ Λ2−Λ32
−6τ
Λ2−Λ3
+ 3 +
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Λ22
−τ + Λ32
−4τx. Notice that the rounded CTR2 in θ2 is always greater than the one in θ1, given Λ2 ≥ Λ3,
while CTR2(θ1) = Λ32−2τ > Λ22(−4+φ)τ = CTR2(θ2) when Λ2Λ3 < 2
2τ−φτ
.
We have that S˜W (θ1) > S˜W (θ2) when x > 22τ Λ2−Λ32
−4τ
Λ2−Λ3
. Thus a2 gets a lower CTR by increasing her bid,
which proves that the algorithm is not monotone.
The example can be extended also to the case where Approximation 1 is applied introducing ads with qv = 0
and γi,j = 0, s.t. logN = K .
5 FNEaa(K)-r is APX-complete
In this section we will prove the APX-hardness of FNEaa(K)-r and provide a 1/2-approximation algorithm.
5.1 Hardness
In this section we prove that FNEaa(K)-r is APX–hard.
Theorem 3. FNEaa(K)-r cannot be approximated within a factor of 11+α , for α < 1412 , unless P = NP .
Proof. We reduce from the Asymmetric TSP with weights in {1, 2}, hereinafter denoted as ATSP (1, 2). The
ATSP (1, 2) problem demands finding a minimum cost Hamiltonian tour in a complete directed weighted graph
G′ = (T,A) where T is the set of nodes of G′, A is the set of edges and the weight function wi,j ∈ {1, 2}
for all edges (i, j) ∈ A. ATSP (1, 2) cannot be approximated in polynomial time within a factor of 11+β , with
β < 1/206 [8]. Below, we denote as τ a solution of an ATSP (1, 2) instance, as cost(τ) its cost and as τ∗ the
optimal tour.
Given an instance of ATSP (1, 2) on graph G′ = (T,A) we construct an instance of FNEaa(K)-r as follows:
(i) for each vertex ti ∈ T we generate an ad ai with qi = vi = 1, then we have N = |T |; (ii) the contextual graph
is G = ([N ], E), where (i, j) ∈ E iff wi,j = 1; (iii) for all (i, j) ∈ E , γi,j = 1; and finally (iv) the number of
slots is equal to the cost of the optimal tour τ∗ in ATSP (1, 2), i.e. K = cost(τ∗). We will show at the end of
the proof how we can deal with the fact that we do not know cost(τ∗). Observe that with K = cost(τ∗), we have
SW (θ∗) = N , θ∗ denoting the optimal solution of the FNEaa(K)-r instance constructed. The definition of the
reduction is completed by observing that an allocation θ for the FNEaa(K)-r that allocates all the N ads can be
easily mapped back to a tour τ for the ATSP (1, 2) by simply substituting the ad with the corresponding vertex
of the graph G′.
Let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a 11+α -approximate algorithm for FNEaa(K)-r,
with α < β2 <
1
412 . Let θα be the
1
1+α–approximate solution returned by such an algorithm, i.e., SW (θα) ≥
1
1+αSW (θ
∗) = N1+α . It is easy to check that θα consists of ⌈
N
1+α⌉ ads, each providing a contribution of 1 to the
social welfare, while there are SW (θ∗)−⌈ N1+α⌉ ads that w.l.o.g. we can consider empty. Moreover, being α < 1,
N
1+α ≥ cost(τ
∗)− N1+α holds. For the sake of conciseness, hereinafter we omit the ceiling notation. Let τβ be the
tour obtained from θα. We state that in τβ there are, at least, 2N1+α −cost(τ
∗)−1 edges of weight 1. Divide the ads
allocated in θα in two sets: the N1+α allocated ads ai i ∈ [N ] and a⊥. Allocate in alternation one of the
N
1+α ads
ai, with i ∈ [N ], and one of the cost(τ∗)− N1+α ads a⊥. When the slot index 2(cost(τ
∗)− N1+α ) is reached, the
available a⊥ are finished, thus, in the following cost(τ∗)−2(cost(τ∗)− N1+α ) =
2N
1+α − cost(τ
∗) slots, only non-
fictitious ads ai, i ∈ [N ], are consecutively allocated (no slots are left empty). This means that in θα, where the ads
are disposed in a different way, we still have the guarantee that there are 2N1+α−cost(τ
∗)−1 pairs of consecutive ads
(ai, aj) s.t. γi,j = 1. Thus, in the tour τβ there are, at least, 2N1+α−cost(τ
∗)−1 edges of weight 1. Therefore, given
that a tour is composed ofN edges, in τβ there can be at mostN− 2N1+α+cost(τ
∗)+1 edges of weight 2. The length
of τβ is upper-bounded by cost(τβ) ≤ 2N1+α−cost(τ
∗)−1+2(N− 2N1+α+cost(τ
∗)+1) = cost(τ∗)+ 2Nα1+α+1. Now
we can state: cost(τβ) ≤ cost(τ∗)+ 2αN1+α+1 ≤ cost(τ
∗)+2αN ≤ cost(τ∗)+2αcost(τ∗) = (1+2α) cost(τ∗) <
(1 + β) cost(τ∗), where: (i) the second inequality holds for N ≥ 1+α2α2 ; (ii) the third inequality holds since
N ≤ cost(τ∗) and (iii) the last inequality holds since, by assumption, α < β2 . Thus, for the instances where
N ≥ 1+α2α2 if there were an algorithm that
1
1+α–approximates FNEaa(K)-r with α <
1
412 , there would be a
1
1+β
approximation of ATSP (1, 2) with β < 1206 . We obtained an absurd.
We finally show that we can deal with the non existence of the oracle returning cost(τ∗). For all the in-
stances of ATSP (1, 2) with N vertices, N ≤ cost(τ∗) ≤ 2N . So, we run the polynomial 11+α–approximation
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algorithm of FNEaa(K)-r for all the values K = m with m ∈ {N . . . , 2N}, obtain m tours τmβ and set
τβ = argminm∈{N,...,2N} cost(τ
m
β ), guaranteeing cost(τβ) ≤ cost(τ
cost(τ∗)
β ).
5.2 1
2
-Approximate Greedy Algorithm for FNE
aa
(c)-r, for any c
. The algorithm orders the ads in nonincreasing order of qivi and allocates them in the odd slots, starting from the
one with the highest product; even slots are left empty.
Proposition 5. The greedy algorithm above is 12 -approxi-mate for FNEaa(c)-r, for any c.
Proof. Let θ.5 be the allocation obtained by the algorithm. We want to prove that SW (θ.5) ≥ SW (θ∗)/2.
W.l.o.g., rename the ads so that q1v1 ≥ q2v2 ≥ . . . ≥ qNvN . Let K ′ = ⌈K/2⌉. We have SW (θ.5) =∑
m∈[K′] Λ2m−1qmvm. On the other hand, SW (θ∗) ≤
∑
m∈[K]Λmqmvm. Since Λiqivi ≥ Λi+1qi+1vi+1,
we have Λiqivi ≥ 1/2
∑
m=i,i+1 Λmqmvm. We conclude:
SW (θ.5) =
∑
m∈[K′]
Λ2m−1qmvm ≥
∑
m∈[K′]
Λ2m−1q2m−1v2m−1 ≥
1/2
∑
m∈[K]
Λmqmvm ≥ SW (θ
∗)/2.
The greedy algorithm above is a MIR, range Θ′ being all the allocations that leave even slots empty. The solution
output is indeed the one guaranteeing maximum social welfare in Θ′. We therefore have proved the existence of a
1/2-approximate truthful polynomial-time mechanism for FNEaa(c)-r.
6 FNEaa(c) is APX-hard
We now prove that FNEaa(1)-r (Proposition 6) and FNEaa(1)-nr (Proposition 7) are APX-hard. First we state two
auxiliary lemmata. Hereinafter, for the sake of notation, we will denote as SW1(θ) and SWK(θ) the objective
function of B–FNEaa(1)-r and B–FNEaa(K)-r, respectively.
Lemma 1. Let θ be an allocation (possibly containing empty slots) and let θ′ be the allocation obtained from θ
by replacing, for each pair (ai−1, ai) in θ such that γi−1,i = 0, ad ai−1 with a⊥. Then SW1(θ) = SW1(θ′).
Proof. Let (ai−1, ai) be the first pair of ads in θ with the property that γi−1,i = 0, and let θ′′ be the allo-
cation obtained from θ by substituting ai−1 with a⊥. Let SWA1 (θ) =
∑i−2
j=1 CTRj(θ)vj and SWB1 (θ) =∑K
j=i+1 CTRj(θ)vj denote the contributions to the SW of the ads allocated, respectively, above and below
the pair (ai−1, ai). We can write SW1(θ) = SWA1 (θ) + SWB1 (θ) + CTRi−1(θ)vi−i + CTRi(θ)vi. By as-
sumption, we have CTRi−1(θ)vi−i = 1 (as CTRi−1(θ) = 1 and ai−1 6= a⊥) and CTRi(θ)vi = 0. We
note that SWA1 (θ′′) = SWA1 (θ) and SWB1 (θ′′) = SWB1 (θ). Furthermore, we note that CTRi−1(θ′′)vi−i +
CTRi(θ
′′)vi = 1, as vi−i = 0 and CTRi(θ′′) = 1. So we can conclude that SW1(θ) = SW1(θ′′). By repeatedly
applying the above procedure on θ′′ we can obtain an allocation θ′ containing no pair of ads (ai−1, ai) where
γi−1,i = 0 and such that SW1(θ) = SW1(θ′).
Lemma 2. Let θ be an allocation such that no pair of ads (ai−1, ai) exists where γi−1,i = 0. Then SW1(θ) =
SWK(θ).
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that ∀i ∈ N , CTRi(θ) = 1 for both B–FNEaa(1)-r and B–FNEaa(K)-r
if θ does not contain any pair of ads (ai−1, ai) for which γi−1,i = 0.
Proposition 6. FNEaa(1)-r is APX-hard.
Proof. We prove that the subproblemB–FNEaa(1)-r is APX–hard via an approximation preserving reduction from
the APX-hard problem B–FNEaa(K)-r (Theorem 3). In particular, we will show that computing an approximate
solution for B–FNEaa(1)-r is not easier than B–FNEaa(K)-r on the same instance.
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We will first prove that SWK(θ∗K) ≤ SW1(θ∗1) holds, where θ∗K and θ∗1 denote, respectively, the optimal
allocation for B–FNEaa(K)-r and B–FNEaa(1)-r. For the sake of contradiction, let us suppose that SWK(θ∗K) >
SW1(θ
∗
1). We can assume without loss of generality that θ∗K does not contain a pair (ai−1, ai) such that γi−1,i = 0,
as replacing ai−1 with a⊥ would yield an allocation with a non-decreasing SW value. By Lemma 2 and by
hypothesis we have that SW1(θ∗K) = SWK(θ∗K) > SW1(θ∗1), which contradicts the optimality of θ∗1 .
We are now going to prove that given an α–approximate solution θα1 to the objective of B–FNEaa(1)-r we can
compute in polynomial time an approximate solution θαK to the objective of B–FNEaa(K)-r such that SW1(θα1 ) ≤
SWK(θ
α
K). This is easily done by replacing ai−1 with a⊥ for each couple of ads (ai−1, ai) in θα1 such that γi−1,i =
0, thus obtaining θ′α1 . By Lemmata 1 and 2 we finally conclude that SW1(θα1 ) = SW1(θ′α1 ) = SWK(θ′α1 ).
Proposition 7. FNEaa(1)-nr is APX-hard.
Proof. We conduct the proof by reduction from problem B–FNEaa(1)-r. In particular, we add to the instance of
B–FNEaa(1)-r K new ads {aN+1, . . . , aN+K} such that: (i) vj = 0 for all j ∈ {N + 1, . . . , N + K} and (ii)
γi,j = γj,i = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N +K} and j ∈ {N + 1, . . . , N +K}. Let θαnr be an α-approximate solution
for the so-defined FNEaa(1)-nr problem. We can assume w.l.o.g. that θαnr does not contain any a⊥, as in the no-
reset model we can always allocate any non-allocated ad to an empty slot obtaining a non-decreasing SW value.
We observe that, from a generic allocation θnr, it is possible to obtain an allocation θr by substituting any ad aj ,
j ∈ {N + 1, . . . , N +K}, in θnr with a⊥ s.t. SW r(θr) = SWnr(θnr), and vice versa. Thus, from θαnr we can
obtain an allocation θαr s.t. SW r(θαr ) = SWnr(θαnr); SW x(θ) denoting the social welfare of θ ∈ Θ in the model
with reset x ∈ {r, nr}. Furthermore, let θ∗r and θ∗nr be the optimal solutions, respectively, for B–FNEaa(1)-r
and the FNEaa(1)-nr defined by our reduction. According to the observations above, it is easy to check that
SW r(θ∗r ) = SW
nr(θ∗nr) holds. In fact, let θ˜nr be the solution obtained from θ∗r by substituting each a⊥ with an
ad aj , j ∈ {N + 1, . . . , N + K}. Then SW r(θ∗r ) = SWnr(θ˜nr). Furthermore, SWnr(θ˜nr) = SWnr(θ∗nr),
as otherwise if SWnr(θ˜nr) < SWnr(θ∗nr) we could translate θ∗nr into a solution θ˜r for B–FNEaa(1)-r such
that SW r(θ∗r ) < SW r(θ˜r). A similar argument holds if we consider the allocation θ˜r obtained by substituting
all ads aj , j ∈ {N + 1, . . . , N + K}, in θ∗nr with a⊥. Finally, SW r(θαr ) = SWnr(θαnr) ≥ αSWnr(θ∗nr) =
αSW r(θ∗r ).
7 FNE+aa(c)-nr is APX-complete for constant γmin
Theorem 4. FNE+aa(1)-nr is APX-hard.
Proof. Let {γmin, 1}-FNE+aa(1)-nr denote the subclass of FNE+aa(1)-nr where γij ∈ {γmin, 1} for all i, j ∈ N
and a given 0 < γmin < 1. We prove the APX-hardness of FNE+aa(1)-nr by an approximation preserving
reduction from problem B-FNEaa(1)-nr (proved APX-hard in Proposition 7) to problem {γmin, 1}-FNE+aa(1)-
nr: we prove the existence of an α-approximate algorithm for {γmin, 1}-FNE+aa(1)-nr to imply the existence of a
2α-approximate algorithm for B-FNEaa(1)-nr.
The instance of {γmin, 1}-FNE+aa(1)-nr is obtained from the instance of B-FNEaa(1)-nr by simply setting
γ′i,j = γmin =
1
K−1 for all i, j ∈ N such that γi,j = 0 in the given instance of B-FNEaa(1)-nr, γ
′
i,j = 1
otherwise.
Let θ∗γmin and θ
∗
B be an optimal solution for problems {γmin, 1}-FNE+aa(1)-nr and B-FNEaa(1)-nr, respec-
tively. We have SW (θ∗B) ≤ SW (θ∗γmin). Indeed, if there is no (ai−1, ai) ∈ θ
∗
B s.t. γi−1,i = 0 then SW (θ∗B) =
SW (θ∗γmin), whereas if there is a pair (ai−1, ai) ∈ θ
∗
B s.t. γi−1,i = 0 then SW (θ∗B) < SW (θ∗γmin).
Let now θγmin be an α-approximation of {γmin, 1}-FNE+aa(1)-nr and let θB be the corresponding solution
for B-FNEaa(1)-nr. (I.e., θB is the solution θγmin where the γmin externalities weigh 0.) We now prove that
SW (θγmin) ≤ 2SW (θB). We have SW (θB) = 1 + P(θB), where P(θB) ≤ K − 1 denotes the number of pairs
(ai−1, ai) of ads in θB such that γi−1,i = 1. Likewise, SW (θγmin) = 1+P(θγmin)+(K−1−P(θγmin)) ·γmin.
By construction, P(θB) = P(θγmin) = P , from which it follows that SW (θγmin) ≤ 2 · SW (θB) is equivalent
to 1 + K−1−P1+P γmin ≤ 2. This is proved by noticing that 1 +
K−1−P
1+P γmin ≤ 1 +
K−1
1+P γmin =
P+2
P+1 , where last
equality follows from definition of γmin.
7.1 Approximation algorithm
We now prove that any α-approximate algorithm for Weighted 3-Set Packing (W3SP) can be turned into an
(αγcmin)–approximation algorithm for FNE+aa(c)–nr.
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Given a universe U and a collection of its subsets each of cardinality at most 3 and associated to a weight,
W3SP consists of finding a sub-collection of pairwise-disjoint subsets of maximal weight. Several constant-ratio
approximate algorithms are known in literature to solve this problem, e.g., the algorithm in [4] provides a 1/2-
approximation. We now present a reduction from FNE+aa(c)-nr to W3SP, similar in spirit to that defined, for
positive only externalities, in [6].
Theorem 5. Given an α–approximate algorithm for problem W3SP, we can obtain an (αγcmin)-approximation
algorithm for problem FNE+aa(c)-nr.
Proof. Given an instance of FNE+aa(c)-nr, we obtain an instance of W3SP by means of the following reduction. To
simplify the presentation, we suppose thatK is even (the proof can be easily extended for an oddK). We divideK
into K/2 blocks of two slots each. We construct a collection of K2 ·
(
N
2
)
sets, each set having the form {ai, aj , p},
where p ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . ,K − 1} and i, j ∈ N . The weight of a set is defined as the maximum social welfare that
ads ai and aj can provide when assigned to slots sp and sp+1 without taking into considerations the externalities
of ai and aj on the ads allocated to slots sm, m 6= p, p + 1. Specifically, W (ai, aj , p) = max{Λpqivi +
Λp+1γi,jqjvj ,Λpqjvj + Λp+1γj,iqivi}. Note that there is an immediate mapping between solutions of W3SP
and FNE+aa(c)-nr. For a solution θS of W3SP, let W (θS) denote its total weight. Now, let θ∗S and θ∗ denote,
respectively, an optimal allocation for W3SP and an optimal allocation for FNE+aa(c)-nr. Furthermore, let θαS be
an α-approximate solution for W3SP, and θα be the corresponding solution to FNE+aa(c)-nr. Since in W3SP, outer-
block externalities are not taken into consideration, we have: W (θ∗S) ≥ SW (θ∗) and SW (θα) ≥ γcminW (θαS).
From these inequalities we obtain: SW (θα) ≥ γcminW (θαS) ≥ αγcminW (θ∗S) ≥ αγcminSW (θ∗).
Corollary 1. If γmin is bounded from below by a constant (i.e., γmin ∈ Ω(1)), then FNE+aa(c)-nr is approximable
within a constant factor.
It can be easily shown that the above algorithm is not monotone.
Theorem 6. The algorithm of Theorem 5 is not monotone
Proof. Consider an instance I of FNE+aa(1)-nr with N = K = 4 wherein Λ3γz,4 < Λ4γ3,4, for z ∈ {1, 2},
v1, v2 ≫ v3, v4 and γ1,2 = γ2,1 = 1 so that W (a1, a2, 1) is much bigger than any other W (ai, aj, 1). There-
fore, any reasonable approximation of the W3SP instance constructed upon I must return sets {a1, a2, 1} and
{a3, a4, 3}. Additionally consider v4 < Λ4γ4,3Λ23−Λ3Λ4γ3,4 so that W (a3, a4, 3) = Λ3q3v3 + Λ4γ3,4q4v4. So the so-
lution θ returned by the algorithm run on I places a4 in s4, resulting in CTR4(θ) = q4Λ4γ3,4. Take now the
instance I ′ defined as I except that v1, v2 ≫ v′4 >
Λ4γ4,3
Λ23−Λ3Λ4γ3,4
> v4. As before, the approximation algorithm for
W3SP will return sets {a1, a2, 1} and {a3, a4, 3} but this time W ′(a3, a4, 3) = Λ3q4v4 +Λ4γ4,3q3v3. Therefore,
the solution θ′ returned by the algorithm run on I ′ places ad a4 in slot s3, i.e., CTR4(θ′) = q4Λ3γz,4, where
z ∈ {1, 2} is the ad placed in slot s2 in the allocation θ′. The algorithm is therefore not monotone and cannot be
used to design a truthful mechanism.
8 Approximating FNEaa(c)-nr
Similarly to the case c = K , Color Coding can be applied to design an optimal exponential-time algorithm
finding the optimal solution and a simple modification of such algorithm returns a log(N)2min{N,K} approximation in
polynomial time. While the basic idea is the same, some details change here.
We denote by S ⊆ C a subset of colors and by δ(a) a function returning the color assigned to a. Given a
coloring δ, the best colorful allocation is found by dynamic programming. For |S| > c, W (S, 〈ah0 , . . . , ahc〉)
contains the value of the best allocation with colors in S in which the last c + 1 ads are ah0 , . . . , ahc from
top to bottom. (The definition naturally extends for |S| ≤ c.) Starting from W (∅, 〈〉) = 0, we can compute
W recursively. For instance, for |S| > c, W (S ∪ {δ(ahc)}, 〈ah0 , . . . , ahc〉) = Λ|S|+1vhcqhc
∏c−1
i=0 γhi,hi+1 +
maxaW (S, 〈a, ah0 , . . . , ahc−1〉) if δ(ahc) 6∈ S and −∞ otherwise. Given a random coloring, the probability that
the ads composing the best allocation are colorful is K!
KK
. Thus, repeating the procedure reK times, where r ≥ 1,
the probability of finding the best allocation is 1− e−r. The complexity is O((2e)KKN c+2). The algorithm can
be derandomized with an additional cost of O(log2(N)).
By applying the above algorithm to the first K ′ slots, K ′ = min{K, ⌈log(N)⌉}, we obtain an algorithm with
complexity O(K3.5N c+2 log22(N)). We observe that if c is not a constant, the complexity is exponential. It is not
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too hard to note that such an algorithm is log(N)2min{N,K} -approximate. Moreover, this algorithm is MIR and as such
can be used to design a truthful mechanism.
9 Conclusions
We enrich the literature on externalities in SSAs by introducing more general ways to model slot- and ad-dependent
externalities, while giving a (nearly) complete picture of the computational complexity of the problem. In detail,
we enrich the naive model of SSAs by adding: (i) the concepts of limited user memory (ii) contextual externalities
and (iii) refreshable user memory (i.e., reset model).
This gives rise to the FNEsa model, where ad- and slot-dependent externalities are factorized as in the cascade
model and the FNEaa model, where the externalities and not factorized.
We satisfactorily solve the problem for FNEsa, whereas our results leave unanswered a number of interesting
questions, with regards to both approximation and truthfulness for FNEaa. The parameter c is central to this list.
If c is constant, then we do not know whether a constant approximation algorithm for FNEaa(c) exists; this holds
also for the special case of FNE+aa(c)-nr when γmin is not a constant. In the latter case, when γmin is instead
constant we are not aware of any truthful constant approximation mechanism. Motivated by the fact that FNEaa-r
is, apparently, an easier problem than FNEaa-nr, we believe that an interesting direction for future research is to
study reset in more detail in order to understand its role w.r.t. the relatively harder FNEaa-nr.
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